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15. Unraveling the law of war 
Stephen Ellmann* 
Ten years ago, in Hamdi, 1 Justice O'Connor wrote that the Court's 
understanding of the law of war might "unravel." "Unraveling," it turns 
out, is not precisely the right word. But the thesis of this chapter is that 
the law of war has indeed - already - substantially evolved as it has 
encountered the war, or conflict, with terrorism. In this clash of 
ideologies and arms, the United States and other nations confront an 
adversary different in many respects from the uniformed soldiers who 
were the enemy in past wars. It is possible to argue that these differences 
are so important that in fact we are simply not in war or armed conflict, 
but I will reject that argument, and will argue instead that our understand-
ing of what armed conflict is should adapt to the character of the use of 
force today. At the same time, I will maintain that it is impossible to 
ignore the differences between past and present conflicts, and that the 
process of fighting justly in wars of this new character calls on courts to 
play roles much broader than they may historically have played in the 
United States (US). In short, I will argue that the constitutional war 
power of the US now extends to conflicts substantially different from 
many of the wars we have recognized in the past, and that the 
constitutional authority of courts in these conflicts is and should also now 
be substantially different. 
This chapter is an attempt to work out the implications of one 
fundamental intuition - that much of the reason that many observers have 
resisted calling the struggle against terrorism a war is that they fear the 
war paradigm will undercut the human rights of those caught up within 
it. There is a great deal of justification for that fear, but the best way to 
respond to it is not by denying that the ferocious acts of terrorists are part 
* My thanks to the organizers and the other participants in the conference of 
the International Association of Constitutional Law, Research Group on Consti-
tutional Responses to Terrorism, on "Constitutionalism Across Borders in the 
Struggle Against Terrorism" and as always to Teresa Delcorso-Ellmann. 
1 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (plurality opinion of 
O'Connor, J.). 
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of an armed conflict. Rather, the best way to protect the rights that this 
conflict may jeopardize is to address, head-on, the question of what 
rights the law of this new kind of war must protect. In sketching this 
argument, I will speak quickly about many topics that undoubtedly each 
deserve more extensive treatment, but I hope that this short statement of 
my argument will demonstrate the potential of the approach I am 
advocating. 
I. THE RESHAPING OF ARMED CONFLICT 
There have been a great many conflicts involving arms, and by no means 
all of them have involved uniformed combatants arrayed on the two 
sides. Nevertheless the classic modern conception of war, the conception 
that pervaded first the Hague Conventions and then the Geneva Conven-
tions, was of a clash of armies like these. As others have observed, in 
wars of this sort, when combatants are targeted or captured there are few 
questions of whether or not they are in fact combatants.2 Though not 
every fighter is properly in uniform, most are, and no elaborate or 
sophisticated factfinding apparatus is needed to read their insignia. Nor 
do such combatants shrink from being identified as such after capture, 
because ordinarily their uniforms are sufficient to demonstrate their 
entitlement to prisoner of war (POW) status, and that status is non-
criminal and nonpunitive (so long as the terms of the Third Geneva 
Convention are observed). Moreover, although no one knows when a war 
begins what the date of its completion will be, twentieth century wars 
between states did in fact have endings, and (compared to the war against 
terrorism) quite rapid ones. 
Once the domain of armed conflicts expands to include terrorists, the 
legal issues surrounding detention (and targeting) all become much more 
fraught. Questions of jdentification abound, for terrorists rarely wear 
uniforms, and the dividing line between civilians and fighters is far from 
clear-cut. Terrorists also by no means welcome identification as fighters. 
If they are so identified, they do not become entitled to the protections of 
POWs, because their own fighting tactics - including deliberate attacks 
2 The difference is not absolute: "even in state-versus-state warfare the 
enemy soldier identification problem is not eliminated." Matthew C. Waxman, 
Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of Suspected 
Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1382 (2008). Waxman discusses both the 
identification problem and the high stakes resulting from the prospect of 
unending detention, an issue I take up in the text below. 
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on civilians and the obvious lack of uniforms - disqualify them from 
POW status. (Al Qaeda fighters do, to be sure, still benefit from the 
protections of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
now that it has been established - in US Law, at any rate3 - that the 
conflict between the US and Al Qaeda is at least a non-international 
armed conflict.) In addition, they cannot count on release at any time 
soon, or indeed ever. If the basic rule of combatant detention in 
international armed conflicts, namely that combatants can be held until 
the end of hostilities, applies to the kinds of hostilities in which terrorists 
and the US engage, it is quite possible to argue that these hostilities will 
continue longer than the lifetimes of all those in detention. 
Moreover, it is quite clear that the events of terrorist attacks overlap 
with the domain of criminal law in a way that traditional military 
activities do not. We do not intuitively speak of the movements of army 
divisions as crimes, but we have a long history of prosecuting politically-
motivated acts of terror under the criminal law. It can be argued that what 
we confront is an insidious and widespread - indeed, transnational -
criminal conspiracy, rather than a military force. 
One might respond to all this by saying that the conflicts between the 
US and terrorists are not, in fact, armed conflicts - except, that is, when 
these conflicts actually take the form of clashes of armies, as in 
Afghanistan. If that is so, then international humanitarian law or the law 
of war does not apply to them. Arguably those engaged in terrorism 
could only be detained after criminal conviction, although the exact 
dimensions of either US constitutional law on preventive detention of 
terrorists or the international human rights law on the same subject are 
3 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629-31 (2006). Common Article 3 
confers protections on all those affected by "armed conflict not of an inter-
national character." These protections are far less elaborately specified than the 
protections the Geneva Conventions secure for those talcing part, or caught up, in 
international armed conflicts, but they are important nonetheless. Among the 
most important protections are absolute bars, set out in art 3(1), on "violence to 
life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture"; "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment"; and - the point at issue in Hamdan - "the passing of sentences and 
the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a 
regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135. 
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not entirely certain.4 Assuming, however, that detention would only be 
possible on the basis of criminal law procedures, problems of identifi-
cation would be resolved by application of the beyond a reasonable doubt 
rule (not a perfect rule, as evidence of wrongful convictions attests, but as 
good as we have got). Problems of unregulated and abusive treatment in 
detention would be resolved by the Eighth Amendment, at least for 
prisoners inside the US, and by the regimes of criminal punishment in 
general. Problems of indefinite detention would be resolved as well, at 
least as long as criminal sentences provided for a term of years. Even 
sentences that were indefinite in duration would at least be imposed by a 
duly constituted authority other than the detaining forces. 
But this solution is not satisfactory, for two related reasons. 
First, it misses the reality of the kinds of clashes we now must deal 
with. Clearly, at least some conflicts with terrorism attain a level of 
ferocity and intensity that qualifies them as armed conflicts.5 The US war 
with the Taliban, when the Taliban were the effective government of 
Afghanistan, was such a conflict - a classic, interstate conflict.6 When 
the Taliban were toppled from power and became an insurgency against 
the new government of Afghanistan, the war continued, now probably 
best characterized as a non-international armed conflict.7 At the very 
least, Al Qaeda, when it joined in the Taliban's war effort, became a 
participant in these conflicts - though I will argue that Al Qaeda was in 
fact party to an armed conflict in its own right as well. Moreover, in this 
war it seems clear that some people who are members of no army are 
nevertheless people carrying out a "continuous combat function," who 
4 On the complex interplay of different bodies of international law bearing 
on detention, see Marco Sassoli & Laura M. Olson, The Relationship Between 
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where It Matters: 
Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in Non-International Armed 
Conflicts, 90 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 599 (2008). 
5 Claus KreB, Some Reflections on the International Legal Framework 
Governing Transnational Armed Conflicts, 1.5 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW 245 
(2010). 
6 See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 
1032 (2004). Ackerman maintains that "the struggle against Osama bin Laden 
and Al Qaeda," in contrast, is not a war - but for the reasons laid out in this 
chapter, I disagree. 
7 See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CON-
FLICTS 10 (2011). 
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deserve (as the ICRC study maintains8) to be viewed not as civilians -
subject to military targeting only while engaged in combat - but as 
fighters who are subject to targeting at all times. If only for this subset of 
conflicts with terrorists, we must confront the problems of potentially 
wrongful and indefinite detention that this kind of adversary presents. 
But the point extends to events that involve far fewer attackers than the 
extensive fighting in Afghanistan features . It is generally acknowledged 
that Al Qaeda's terrorist strikes on 9/11 amounted to an "armed attack" 
against the US, triggering a right of self-defense.9 But those strikes were 
carried out by 19 men. Those men were hardly an army, but they were 
fighters, engaged - I would say - in a continuous combat function, over 
the months that were required for them to make their way to the airplanes 
they would commandeer. If we do not say that, then we have to describe 
these men as having been, over those months, civilians engaged only in 
planning for a crime, while we simultaneously declare that the result of 
their prolonged efforts suddenly transformed itself into a military event. 
This abrupt transition from crime to warfare is too metaphysical; those 
who are directly engaged in the many steps needed to execute a terrorist 
armed attack are, I would say, engaged in hostilities throughout. 
To the same effect, we can rightly say that we had a right of 
self-defense against them at every point in their progress. This view 
appears to be held by the Obama Administration. Kenneth Anderson and 
Benjamin Wittes read Obama Administration statements as "most plaus-
ibly" arguing "that targeting is lawful against a threat that is continuing 
on the part of some actor, and could result in an attack at any particular 
8 NILS MELZER, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT 
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILJTIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARJAN L AW 
(ICRC 2009). 
9 Thus the UN Security Council on September 12, 2001, "Recognizing the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the 
Charter," called the September 11 attacks a "threat to international peace and 
security" and "Expresse[d] its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to 
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, 
in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations." 
S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001). Similarly, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization's Council, on September 12, 2001, "agreed that if it is 
determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it 
shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, 
which states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them all." Press Release, 
Statement by the North Atlantic Council, NATO (Sept. 12, 2001), available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm. 
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point in time - and therefore is continuously imminent with respect to 
that actor; whether the actor is a group, network, individual, or; for that 
matter; a state." 10 Harold Koh somewhat similarly declared in 2010 that: 
in this ongoing armed conflict, the United States has the authority under 
international law, and the responsibility to its citizens, to use force, including 
lethal force, to defend itself, including by targeting persons such as high-level 
al-Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks .... Of course, whether a particular 
individual will be targeted in a particular location will depend upon consider-
ations specific to each case, including those related to the imminence of the 
threat, the sovereignty of the other states involved, and the willingness and 
ability of those states to suppress the threat the target poses. 11 
As horrendously successful as the 9/11 terrorist attacks were, more-
over, they were not unique. It is a feature of our world today that acts of 
terrorism can impose stunning loss of life. That matters: when people 
commit slaughters, other people fight back; such events are the stuff of 
war. As Gabriella Blum has written, "technology and globalization have 
made individuals (or groups of individuals) capable of inflicting harm in 
a magnitude previously reserved for large organized armed forces." 12 
David Kennedy has observed: 
violence has become a tactic for all sorts of players - warlords and drug lords 
and freelance terrorists and insurgents and religious fanatics and national 
liberation armies and more. States have lost the monopoly on metaphoric, as 
well as actual warfare. War is now the continuation of a far more chaotic 
politics, in a far more chaotic political environment. 13 
10 Kenneth Anderson & Benjamin Wittes, The President's NDU Speech and 
the Pivot from the First Term to the Second (Chapter 3), in KENNETH ANDERSON 
AND BENJAMIN WITTES, SPEAKING THE LAW: THE OBAMA ADMlNISTRATION'S 
ADDRESSES ON NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (2013), available at http:// 
papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2348532 (American University, 
Washington College of Law Research Paper No. 2014-3) (emphasis in original). 
11 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, The Obama 
Administration and International Law, Speech to the American Society of 
International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/Ureleases/ 
remarks/139119.htm. 
12 Gabriella Blum, The Fog of Victory, 24 EUR. J. INT'L L. 391, 420 (2013). 
13 DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW 19 (2006). Kennedy views the 
categorization of events under the law of war as ultimately a matter of 
interpretation rather than firm rules, see, e.g. , id. at 120, 126; I would not go so 
far, and instead argue that the line between these events should be drawn on the 
basis of their actual nature. 
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Terrorism, to be sure, is not new, and the US had anarchist bombings a 
century ago. But just as the internet has made everyone a potential 
publisher, so technology has made a lot of people soldiers. The men who 
attacked Charlie Hebdo, dressed in black, heavily armed, and executing 
those they regarded as their enemies, clearly conceived of themselves as 
warriors, and the harm they did confirms their judgment. 
In short, if we measure the proper scope of military authority by the 
degree of peril presented, we should acknowledge that in today's world it 
is possible for terrorists, even those not gathered on some field of 
conventional battle, to be participants in armed conflict. This remains 
true even if the terrorists are no longer truly gathered together under 
some traditional hierarchy - as may well be the case today, with the 
gradual diminution and fragmentation of Al Qaeda.14 Networking is the 
theme of our world, and networked violence with modern weaponry can 
be armed attack. 15 
Second, while it is true that terrorist "soldiers" are very likely also 
criminals, it must be acknowledged that sometimes these criminals will 
not be convictable. Exactly this problem plagues us today at Guantan-
amo, though for these detainees a significant part of our law enforcement 
problem is that we abused and even tortured them during interrogation, 
with the result that what may be ample evidence of their criminal guilt is 
inadmissible and useless in courts that can claim any degree of constitu-
tional or international legitimacy. But the problem is broader than that. 
Sometimes terrorists cannot be captured, and so cannot be brought to 
justice. Sometimes the evidence of their guilt may be lost because the 
people who first come on the "crime scenes" will be soldiers in battle, 
who will not be in a position to conduct extensive criminal forensic 
examinations. Sometimes, as well, the evidence of guilt may come from 
sources that are entirely undisclosable - not because they are unlawful 
but because they are truly, and necessarily, secret. 
14 On Al Qaeda, see Robert M. Chesney, Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al 
Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism, 112 MICH. L. 
REV. 163, 185-98 (2013). 
15 Current law requires at least two elements to show the existence of a 
non-international armed conflict: 
. (i) the parties involved must demonstrate a certain level of organization, and 
(ii) the violence must reach a certain level of intensity. 
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 7, at 8. My argument 
is, essentially, that the first of these criteria ought to be read with great flexibility, 
given the stunning degree to which the second criterion - the intensity of 
violence - can now be met by very modestly organized actors. 
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It is quite true that many convictions of terrorism have been won in the 
civilian federal courts, and I am not at all arguing against such prosecu-
tions when they are feasible. 16 But where they are not, if the only 
paradigm within which we can lawfully proceed is the criminal justice 
system, we may have no way to proceed at all. That's true for any crime, 
of course, and we accept it as part of a just Jaw enforcement system. The 
harms that terrorists can inflict can burst the bounds of what we normally 
encounter in criminal law, however, and it is hard to accept that they 
might do so without lawful consequence. It is precisely to prevent harms 
of such magnitude that the Geneva Conventions permit the parties to 
international armed conflicts to detain each other's soldiers until the end 
of the hostilities. Otherwise the soldiers will return to the battlefield. 
None of this is an argument for the casual use of military force. Had 
we realized who the 9/11 attackers were in advance, we surely would not 
have bombed them as they moved about American cities, any more than 
we bombed the German saboteurs who slipped into the US in World War 
II and were arrested and tried in the case that became Ex parte Quirin. 17 
But that would have been because no such steps were needed. The reason 
would not have been that they were civilians, entitled to be acted against 
only in a law enforcement paradigm. It might well be appropriate to 
impose special restrictions, as a matter of policy or of law, on the use of 
military force against targets who are not in a '"hot' conflict zone" - like 
the 9/11 attackers in the pre-attack period. Jennifer Daskal has cogently 
argued for such legal limits. 1s But Daskal's approach "assumes that the 
conflict extends to wherever the enemy threat is found,"19 and this 
assumption makes sense.20 
16 See Laurie R. Blank, What's in a Word: War, Law and Counterterrorism, in 
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OP LAW AND TERRORISM (Genevieve Lennon & Clive 
Walker eds. 2015); Federal Courts Continue to Take lead in Counterterrorism 
Prosecutions [Fact Sheet], HUMAN RlGHTS FIRST (July 13, 2012), http://www. 
h u manrightsfirst.org/2012/07 /13/federal-courts-continue-to-take-lead-in-counter 
terrorism-prosecutions-fact-sheet. 
17 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
18 Jennifer C. Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for 
Detention and Targeting Outside the "Hot" Conflict Zone, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
1165 (2013). 
19 Id. at 1172. 
20 But see INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OP THE RED CROSS, supra note 7, at 
22. The ICRC argues here that one reason to reject this view is "the consequence 
that would be borne by civilians or civilian objects in the non-belligerent states." 
Id. That is of course an important concern, but legal limits on the use of force 
outside hot conflict zones in principle could address it. The ICRC also refers to 
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What then is to be done? The conflicts in which we are now embroiled 
present grave risks to those we may wrongly target for killing, and to 
those whom we do not kiU but instead capture and detain. I will focus 
first, and most extensively, on how the law of war should regulate 
detention; when we have traced the ways that a rights-minded law of war 
can address detention, we will turn briefly to the issues involved in 
targeting.2 1 
Let us start, however, with detention: if the conflicts we are now part 
of will inevitably produce numbers of captives whose actual status as 
fighters is somewhat open to doubt, and who face potentially lifelong 
captivity now that we hold them, then we need a way to protect against 
wreaking such harm wrongly. This is, in fact, what we have already 
evolved. 
(1) The availability of habeas for military detainees: Boumediene is, of 
course, a decision that the writ of habeas corpus applies to military 
detainees.22 I would not assume that POWs from some uniformed army 
in a future war would enjoy the same right, though it is certainly possible 
that they would. (As far as I am aware, no foreign soldiers held in POW 
camps in the US during World War II petitioned for habeas corpus, and 
"possible ius ad bellum issues that this scenario would raise," id., but it is no part 
of my proposal to commit unlawful violations of non-belligerent states' sover-
eignty in the process of pursuing terrorists. More generally, the ICRC argues that 
"with the exception of the few specific acts of terrorism that may take place in 
armed conflict, it is submitted that the term 'act of terrorism' should be reserved 
for acts of violence committed outside of armed conflict." Id. at 51. But the force 
of this point of terminology seems diminished by the number of terrorist acts that 
are in fact prohibited by international humanitarian law, given that (as the ICRC 
itself shows, id. at 49) both treaty law and quite possibly customary law prohibit 
"[a]cts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror 
among the civilian population." 
21 My argument for a "rights-minded law of war" does not rest on a 
resolution of the questions of when and to what extent international human rights 
principles apply in situations of armed conflict, but rather contends that the law 
of war itself should become rights-minded. For a reading of international human 
rights provisions as generally applicable during war, see Jordan J. Paust, Human 
Rights on the Battlefield, 47 G EO. WASH. lNT'L L. REV. 509 (2015), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2563329; for an account 
placing more emphasis on the "lex specialis" of the law of war, see INTER-
NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 7, at 13-20. 
22 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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surely there is less need for such a protection for uniformed troops. But 
as long as membership in a uniformed enemy army is a sufficient basis 
for detention there also would be little cost to the availability of habeas 
for POWs except in rote issuance of denials of the writ if they did have 
the right to seek it.)23 But Boumediene makes clear that prisoners from 
the non-uniformed forces that we have been fighting, who are now held 
at Guantanamo, are entitled to the protections of the Suspension Clause. 
Otherwise the risk of erroneous detention, and more broadly the risk of 
arbitrary executive/military power, is too great.24 Here, unmistakably, one 
aspect of the law of war in the US - the separation of military detention 
authority from judicial oversight - has already "unraveled."25 
(2) The courts' role in determining where hostilities are taking place: 
Boumediene and other cases also reflect that another feature of the law of 
war has, almost unconsciously, come within judicial cognizance. This, as 
Laurie Blank has shown, is the question of where hostilities are taking 
place.26 Part of the rationale for Boumediene is that our control over 
Guantanamo is so complete and unchallenged that the perils of war 
provide no basis for withholding the protection of habeas corpus there.27 
To say that is to say - as indeed the Supreme Court was prepared to say 
23 The ICRC observes that "[i]t is generally uncontroversial that the detain-
ing state is not obliged to provide review, judicial or other, of the lawfulness of 
POW internment as long as active hostilities are ongoing, because enemy 
combatant status denotes that a person is ipso facto a security threat." INTER-
NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 7, at 17. 
24 For the Boumediene Court's analysis of the inadequacy of the procedures 
Congress had provided instead of habeas, see Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779-92. 
The Court specifically notes that "[t]he intended duration of the detention and the 
reasons for it bear upon the precise scope of the inquiry." Id. at 783. The Court's 
emphasis on habeas as a protection of liberty within the separation of powers is 
evident at id. at 743, 765-66. 
25 Deborah Pearlstein has emphasized the degree to which the Supreme 
Court's military detention decisions (among others) do not defer to the executive 
- another indication of the unraveling of the supposed separation of military 
detention authority from judicial oversight. Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Defer-
ence: Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 783, 800-807 (2011). 
26 Laurie R. Blank, Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict and 
. Counterterrorism: Understanding the Parameters of the 'Zone of Combat, 39 GA. 
J. lNT' L & COMP. L. 1, 5 (2010). 
27 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 754-55, 768- 71. 
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in the context of the Civil War, in Ex parte Milligan28 - that the war is in 
one place, but not another. 
( 3) Extending Boumediene to make habeas available, where feasible, even 
in areas of hostilities: To my mind it is clear that an additional step 
should be taken, namely for courts to assess whether the perils of war do 
really prevent access to habeas corpus even when those perils are in fact 
present. This of course was the question while we held detainees in 
Afghanistan, and the D.C. Circuit has adamantly refused to accept the 
existence of a constitutional right to habeas corpus for those detainees 
because war is actually raging there.29 There's no doubt that that 
reasoning has a basis in Boumediene, but the conclusion that the ongoing 
conflict against terrorism provides a reason to deny access to habeas in 
Afghanistan seems ill-founded. The risks of mistaken identification in 
Afghanistan were acute; the resentment fostered in the local population 
by detention was intense; and the surprising reality was that the US was 
clearly capable of elaborating a system of adjudication despite the 
presence of war. In fact, we generated two distinct systems of adjudica-
tion - a system of military review boards of our own,30 and a system of 
actual criminal trials carried out by Afghan authorities in facilities inside 
the US-controlled Bagram base.31 If the reason for judicial involvement 
at Guantanamo is to prevent avoidable injustice, that reason was present 
in Afghanistan too, and so I would say that the fundamental point of 
Boumediene calls for reduced judicial deference to assertions of the 
necessities of war, not only at Guantanamo but also elsewhere. 
(4) Judicial determination of when a war is over: Another issue also 
seems to call for judicial intervention - the question of when the war 
ends.32 The Hamdi plurality says that the power to detain lasts as long as 
28 4 Wall. 2 (1866). 
29 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Al Maqaleh v. Hagel, 
738 F.3d 312 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
3° For a description of this system, see Jeff A. Bovarnick, Detainee Review 
Boards in Afghanistan: From Strategic Liability to Legitimacy, ARMY LAWYER 9 
(June 2010). 
31 For a critical report on these trials, see HUMAN RlGHTS FIRST, DETAINED 
AND DENIED IN AFGHANISTAN: How TO MAKE U.S. DETENTION COMPLY WITH 
THE LAW 23-26 (May 2011). 
32 Deborah Pearlstein has incisively discussed the potential role of courts in 
addressing this issue. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Law at the End of War (Oct. 1, 
2013), Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 406, available at http:// 
papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2334326. 
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the hostilities in question continue, but the hostilities that it points to are 
not the ongoing clashes of the war against terrorism around the world but 
the specific combat under way, then as now, in Afghanistan. But what 
happens when the hostilities in Afghanistan end, as presumably they 
someday will? The answer in current US law is in Ludecke, a case 
decided well after the :fighting ended in World War II that nonetheless 
declared that the President's wartime power to detain and expel enemy 
aliens lasted until the political branches declared the war was over.33 
Perhaps such a declaration will be issued just as the fighting in fact ends, 
but if it is not, it seems to me that courts must speak to the question of 
whether authority for detention still persists. This, again, is suggested by 
Boumediene, in which the Supreme Court said that although it was up to 
the Executive to say where US sovereignty formally extended, that 
authority did not displace the Court's duty to say where the Constitution 
ran.34 
( 5) Judicial review of the conditions of detention for military detainees: 
A further question may now be coming within judicial purview as a 
result of Boumediene: the question of the conditions under which 
terrorism detainees are held. Here too one might maintain that the 
soldiers of uniformed armies do not need the protections of the courts, 
because they already have the protections of POW status under the 
Geneva Conventions. But terrorist :fighters will not have that protection, 
and if anything is apparent from the past decade it is that Common 
Article 3 by itself will not assure detainees of protection against 
mistreatment. But, as it happens, a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit has 
recently ruled that Boumediene, by (according to the D.C. Circuit) 
restoring the whole of statutory habeas protection to detainees, has also 
restored the little-noted (and controversial) authority of habeas courts to 
rule not only on issues of release but also on conditions of confinement.35 
That makes a lot of sense for detainees who are not otherwise well 
33 Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948). 
34 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 755 . I am happy to acknowledge that I learned 
about this issue while working with a student, Melissa Jangl, whose post on the 
implications of the possible end of fighting in Afghanistan can be found on 
"Detained by U.S.", a website maintained for several years by the students in my 
class on "Detention in the War Against Terrorism" at New York Law School. 
.See Melissa Jangl, From Ludecke to Boumediene: A Path to Habeas for Bagram 
Detainees?, Detained by U.S., www.detainedbyus.org/from-ludecke-to-
boumediene-a-path-to-habeas-for-bagram-detainees/ (May 15, 2014). 
35 Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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protected by law. It also makes sense in dealing with detainees whose 
rage against their captors is such that they are prepared to risk death by 
suicide, and to trigger painful forced feeding meant to keep them alive -
the facts that provoked the DC Circuit litigation. When captor and captive 
are so profoundly at odds, courts are needed to hold the balance between 
them. 
There is another reason why courts should have at least some role in 
overseeing the treatment of detainees: that the Constitution requires it. 
This of course is controversial. Two factors suggest, however, that we 
should acknowledge (indeed, embrace) the Constitution's application, at 
least in some respects besides the protection of the Suspension Clause, to 
enemy fighters held in detention.36 
First, Boumediene did not arise from nothing. An important part of its 
basis was in the "Insular Cases" from the era of US colonialism, in which 
the Supreme Court reasoned that while some rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution did not extend beyond the borders of the states, others did.37 
Boumediene is an application of the proposition that the Constitution has 
some measure of force beyond our borders, and there is no reason in 
principle why that measure should end with the Suspension Clause -
especially since there is already some sign, in Justice Kennedy's concur-
rence in Verdugo-Urquidez, that the Fourth Amendment in a proper case 
could reach beyond our borders.38 
36 Though the commands of the US Constitution are not directly part of the 
international Jaw of war, they nonetheless help shape the law of war as 
recognized in American law - since we cannot be party to law, whatever its 
source, that is unconstitutional. The law of war itself, in turn, is a Jaw of nations, 
including the US, and so in the end the requirements of our Constitution do 
indirectly affect the contours of international law. (For an instance of the shaping 
of US law in light of the "universal agreement and practice" of the international 
law of war, see Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) ("The 
capture and detention of lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and trial 
of unlawful combatants, by 'universal agreement and practice,' are 'important 
incident[s] of war."'). Here, in any event, the effect of reading the Constitution as 
I propose is to buttress US adherence to principles of detainee treatment already 
embodied in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 
37 Boumediene describes these cases as holding "that the Constitution has 
independent force in these territories, a force not contingent upon acts of 
legislative grace," though limited by "inherent practical difficulties." 553 U.S. at 
756-59. 
38 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275- 78 (1990) (concur-
ring opinion of Kennedy, J.). For further reflection on Verdugo-Urquidez and the 
Fourth Amendment abroad, see Jennifer Daskal, Transnational Seizures: The 
Constitution Abroad, in this volume. 
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Second, obviously the most acute concern in conditions of confinement 
is torture. It is possible to maintain (at least one lower court has) that the 
Constitution does not prohibit the US from torturing noncitizens 
abroad.39 I have trouble understanding how that proposition squares with 
the underlying constitutional idea (emphasized by Justice Stevens in 
Hamdan) of the "rule of law."40 No case of the US Supreme Court has 
actually held that the Constitution permits us to torture foreigners abroad, 
and we ought not to accept that as the law. If it is not the Law, if the 
Constitution does prohibit at least some mistreatment of detainees abroad 
(not to mention at home), then courts should enforce that safeguard. 
(6) Judicial review of the continued need for military detention: Similar 
logic suggests a further role for the courts. I assumed earlier that the 
hostilities in Afghanistan would someday end. Everything comes to an 
end eventually, but it is by no means clear that the hostilities between the 
US and the terrorist network inspired by Al Qaeda will come to an end in 
our - or the detainees ' - lifetimes. That means that detention under the 
law-of-war principle that the end of the hostilities marks the end of 
detention authority might be the equivalent of life imprisonment. It seems 
to me that the law of war, framed as it was for a world in which wars 
actually did end, should not lightly be understood to have this conse-
quence. Perhaps one should say, as Jonathan Hafetz has thoughtfully 
argued, that in a war without end, some ongoing measure of the need for 
detention against its harm to the detainee should be undertaken.41 Indeed, 
our military tribunals do attempt to assess present threat, so that just 
being eligible for detention as an enemy fighter is not, today, enough to 
found a detention decision. One might ask whether courts can assess 
39 Harbury v. Deutsch, 233 F.3d 596 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev'd on other 
grounds, Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002). 
40 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006). I discuss this aspect of 
Hamdan in Stephen Ellmann, The "Rule of Law " and the Military Commission, 
51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 761 , 781-88 (2006--07). 
4 1 Jonathan Hafetz, Detention Without End?: Reexamining the Indefinite 
Confinement of Terrorism Suspects Through the Lens of Criminal Sentencing, 61 
UCLA L. REv. 326 (2014). Applying a different approach to the problem of 
prolonged detention, Matthew Waxman has argued that law-of-war principles 
governing targeting can inform detention decisionmaking. He urges that "[a]s 
time passes ... the balance between humanitarian costs and military necessities 
that the law of war seeks to mediate tips toward the humanitarian interests," and 
that therefore "[t]he legal framework governing detention of terrorist network 
members should .. . gradually increas[e] the level of confidence necessary to 
continue to hold someone." Waxman, supra note 2, at 1410. 
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threat; I do not think there's much reason to believe that courts -
presented with the necessary information - will be any more fallible at 
this task than soldiers in military tribunals. Meanwhile, the risk of 
injustice in lifelong detention is so profound as to suggest the need for 
judicial intervention. Indeed, the prospect of such indefinite detention 
was part of what drove Boumediene. 
(7) Judicial review of the executive's choice to exercise military detention 
authority: Here is one further possibility, perhaps a more complicated 
one than some of those I have discussed so far. As the early years of the 
Bush Administration's use of military detention made clear, the sheer fact 
that the government designated someone as an enemy combatant in and 
of itself drastically altered the rights that that person retained. A person 
held as an enemy combatant could validly be held that way on far less 
proof than a person held as a criminal defendant - and the designation 
was entirely up to the executive (a point brought home to me by a student 
in class discussion years ago). That prospect remains, and indeed seems 
inherent in a system in which many acts that (on my account) can be 
parts of armed attacks triggering military force are also crimes, not just 
war crimes but violations of the ordinary criminal code of the US. Should 
there be some power for courts to review the designation - not the 
adequacy of proof that someone fits the category into which he has been 
assigned, but the decision to assign the category in the first place? I am 
inclined to say that such a power should exist; one way to establish it 
might be to require a showing that criminal prosecution is actually 
infeasible, as Jennifer Daskal has urged.42 
(8) Judicial review of targeting: How much further should the law of 
war - in its separation (in the US) of executive use of force away from 
judicial oversight - unravel? Here we move from detention to targeting, 
and with that move we add what might seem a critical additional reason 
for judicial restraint: that courts should not interfere with the actual 
conduct of combat. Justice O'Connor in Hamdi noted that "[t]he parties 
agree that initial captures on the battlefield need not receive the process 
we have discussed here; that process is due only when the determination 
is made to continue to hold those who have been seized."43 But as Robert 
Chesney has pointed out, some of the decisionmaking involved in 
targeting "is slow-paced enough ... to allow for a quasi-judicial process 
42 Daskal, supra note 18, at 1217-18. 
43 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.). 
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to unfold within the executive branch, with representatives of various 
agencies and departments reviewing the intelligence and debating its 
implications en route to multiple further stages of review"44 - and if all 
this can happen, one might think that there is a role for courts as well.45 
Is this inconceivable as a general matter? Actually we know it is not. 
That is, we know that one nation, as embroiled in traditional and 
nontraditional conflict as we are, recognizes a much greater role for 
courts than we lately have. That state is Israel. Decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Israel on issues such as targeted killing and indefinite detention 
have received some attention.46 But I am more struck by another case, in 
which the court was asked to intervene in the midst of battle - regular, 
traditional battle - in the Gaza strip.47 The court heard the case. It 
professed no jurisdiction over the issues of military necessity underlying 
decisions to be made about how to fight the battle. But it insisted on its 
authority to regulate the humanitarian law protection of civilians during 
that battle. In fact , an officer of the Israeli army appeared in court to 
receive and implement the court's directions. There is no sign that the 
result was to deprive the Israeli military of its capacity to wage war. 
It might be argued, in response, that to subject military decisionmaking 
to law will have the perverse result of diminishing the moral self-restraint 
that soldiers feel as they make the life-and-death decisions of their 
profession.48 I do not deny that this outcome is conceivable. But at the 
same time I doubt that it is likely. The fear that law will rationalize rather 
44 Robert Chesney, Written Statement, United States House of Representa-
tives, Committee on the Judiciary, Feb. 27, 2013, "Drones and the War on Terror: 
When Can the United States Target Alleged American Terrorists Overseas?," at 
6, available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Research/Filesffestimony/ 
2013/ 02/27 %20drones %20chesney I Robert%20Chesney%20Testimony _House% 
20Committee%20on%20J udiciary _ %2002272013.pdf. 
45 Chesney proposes a judicial role, focused on review of targeting of US 
citizens, id. at 7; for a proposal calling for "an individualized threat requirement, 
a Least-harmful-means test, and meaningful procedural safeguards for lethal 
targeting and Law-of-war detention that take place outside zones of active 
hostilities," to be implemented in part through ex ante "courts or court-like 
review," see Daskal, supra note 18, at 1209-28. 
46 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, HCJ 
769/02 (2005) (targeted killing); A & B v. State of Israel, CrimA 6659/06, 
1'157/07, 8228/07, 3261/08 (2008) (indefinite detention). 
47 Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza, [2004) Israel 
Law Reports 200 [2004). 
48 See KENNEDY, supra note 13, at 167-69; Or Bassok, Missing in Action: 
The Human Eye (this volume). 
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than restrain is analogous to the fear that law, deployed in unjust states as 
a tool to limit injustice, will wind up legitimizing the very injustice it 
challenges. South Africa was such a state, in which anti-apartheid 
activists and lawyers made extensive use of law. They worried about the 
risk of legitimation, but history allows us to say, with confidence, that 
anti-apartheid lawyering did not dampen the massive human struggle 
against that evil system.49 When soldiers and citizens question the 
morality of acts of war, I do not think that court decisions holding those 
acts lawful will easily alleviate their concerns. The conduct of war, like 
the path of constitutionalism, is more than the decisions of courts.50 
CONCLUSION 
In the world we have arrived in, war is more diverse than we had 
expected and more present and frightening as well. We should not deny 
this. Nor should we shrink from applying military force, and military 
paradigms, if called for by the situation we face. But we should also 
address the risk - rightly emphasized by those who have urged that we 
adhere to a criminal rather than a war paradigm - that entering the world 
of military force will tear apart the protections of human rights.51 It is not 
clear to me that adherence to a criminal paradigm will in fact preserve 
any understanding of rights that the threat of terrorism really challenges; 
as Chesney and Goldsmith have noted, different paradigms can and do 
converge.52 The proper solution, it seems to me, is not to try to deny that 
49 I argued for the value of South African lawyers' challenges to state-of-
emergency powers wielded by the apartheid government, despite such concerns 
as legitimation, in a chapter on "Lawyers Against the Emergency," in STEPHEN 
ELLMANN, IN A TIME OF TROUBLE: LAW AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA'S STATE 
OF EMERGENCY 248-74 {1992). 
5° Cf Mark Tushnet, Legal and Political Constitutionalism, and the Response 
to Terrorism, in David Jenkins, Amanda Jacobsen & Anders Henriksen eds., THE 
LONG DECADE: How 9/11 CHANGED THE LAW 141, 153 (arguing, in the context 
of the response to terrorism, that "political and judicial constitutionalism are not 
sharply distinct from each other"). 
51 See Laurie R. Blank, The Consequences of a "War" Paradigm for Counter-
terrorism: What Impact on Basic Rights and Values?, 46 GA. L. REY. 719 (2012). 
52 Robert Chesney and Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of 
Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1079 (2008). More 
recently, Chesney has argued that as the war in Afghanistan moves to an end, 
"the postwar model" will not "necessarily ... depart from the status quo in terms 
of the use of lethal force and military detention." Robert Chesney, Postwar, 5 
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we are now more often in the world of military force than we would like. 
Rather, the solution is to reshape the military paradigm so that it does not 
work the wholesale deprivation of rights that it might once have been 
thought to. I have called this an unraveling of the separation of war from 
judicial authority, but it might be better to say, borrowing from Mac-
beth,53 that what I am urging is to "knit[] up the raveU'd sleave" of war, 
by bringing these two sources of power together. 
HARV. NAT' L SEC. J. 305, 334 (2014). Monica Hakimi has recently urged a form 
of convergence, arguing that a focus on choosing which "domain" - such as law 
enforcement or armed conflict - applies is misleading, and that "all targeting and 
detention law is and ought to be rooted in three core principles: liberty - security, 
mitigation, and mistake." Monica Hakimi, A Functional Approach to Targeting 
and Detention, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1365, 1419 (2012). 
53 William Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act II, Scene ii, line 34. 
